php-doc-en/security/globals.xml

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  <chapter xml:id="security.globals" xmlns="http://docbook.org/ns/docbook" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
   <title>Using Register Globals</title>
   &warn.deprecated.feature-5-3-0.removed-6-0-0;
   <para>
    Perhaps the most controversial change in PHP is when the default value
    for the PHP directive <link linkend="ini.register-globals">
    register_globals</link> went from ON to OFF in PHP 
    <link xlink:href="&url.php.release4.2.0;">4.2.0</link>.  Reliance on this
    directive was quite common and many people didn't even know it existed
    and assumed it's just how PHP works.  This page will explain how one can
    write insecure code with this directive but keep in mind that the
    directive itself isn't insecure but rather it's the misuse of it.
   </para>
   <para>
    When on, register_globals will inject your scripts with all
    sorts of variables, like request variables from HTML forms.  This
    coupled with the fact that PHP doesn't require variable initialization
    means writing insecure code is that much easier.  It was a difficult
    decision, but the PHP community decided to disable this directive by 
    default.  When on, people use variables yet really don't know for sure
    where they come from and can only assume.  Internal variables that are
    defined in the script itself get mixed up with request data sent by
    users and disabling register_globals changes this.  Let's demonstrate
    with an example misuse of register_globals: 
   </para>
   <para>
    <example>
     <title>Example misuse with register_globals = on</title>
     <programlisting role="php">
<![CDATA[
<?php
// define $authorized = true only if user is authenticated
if (authenticated_user()) {
    $authorized = true;
}

// Because we didn't first initialize $authorized as false, this might be
// defined through register_globals, like from GET auth.php?authorized=1
// So, anyone can be seen as authenticated!
if ($authorized) {
    include "/highly/sensitive/data.php";
}
?>
]]>
     </programlisting>
    </example>
   </para>
   <para>
    When register_globals = on, our logic above may be compromised.  When
    off, <varname>$authorized</varname> can't be set via request so it'll
    be fine, although it really is generally a good programming practice to
    initialize variables first.  For example, in our example above we might
    have first done <literal>$authorized = false</literal>.  Doing this
    first means our above code would work with register_globals on or off as
    users by default would be unauthorized.
   </para>
   <para>
    Another example is that of <link linkend="ref.session">sessions</link>.
    When register_globals = on, we could also use
    <varname>$username</varname> in our example below but again you must
    realize that <varname>$username</varname> could also come from other
    means, such as GET (through the URL).
   </para>
   <para>
    <example>
     <title>Example use of sessions with register_globals on or off</title>
     <programlisting role="php">
<![CDATA[
<?php
// We wouldn't know where $username came from but do know $_SESSION is
// for session data
if (isset($_SESSION['username'])) {

    echo "Hello <b>{$_SESSION['username']}</b>";

} else {

    echo "Hello <b>Guest</b><br />";
    echo "Would you like to login?";

}
?>
]]>
     </programlisting>
    </example>
   </para>
   <para>
    It's even possible to take preventative measures to warn when forging is
    being attempted. If you know ahead of time exactly where a variable
    should be coming from, you can check to see if the submitted data is
    coming from an inappropriate kind of submission.  While it doesn't
    guarantee that data has not been forged, it does require an attacker to
    guess the right kind of forging.  If you don't care where the request
    data comes from, you can use <varname>$_REQUEST</varname> as it contains
    a mix of GET, POST and COOKIE data.  See also the manual section on
    using <link linkend="language.variables.external">variables from external
    sources</link>.
   </para>
   <para>
    <example>
     <title>Detecting simple variable poisoning</title>
     <programlisting role="php">
<![CDATA[
<?php
if (isset($_COOKIE['MAGIC_COOKIE'])) {

    // MAGIC_COOKIE comes from a cookie.
    // Be sure to validate the cookie data!

} elseif (isset($_GET['MAGIC_COOKIE']) || isset($_POST['MAGIC_COOKIE'])) {

   mail("admin@example.com", "Possible breakin attempt", $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']);
   echo "Security violation, admin has been alerted.";
   exit;

} else {

   // MAGIC_COOKIE isn't set through this REQUEST

}
?>
]]>
     </programlisting>
    </example>
   </para>
   <para>
    Of course, simply turning off register_globals does not mean your code
    is secure.  For every piece of data that is submitted, it should also be
    checked in other ways.  Always validate your user data and initialize
    your variables!  To check for uninitialized variables you may turn up
    <function>error_reporting</function> to show
    <constant>E_NOTICE</constant> level errors.
   </para>
   <para>
    For information about emulating register_globals being On or Off, see this <link linkend="faq.misc.registerglobals">FAQ</link>.
   </para>

   &note.superglobals;

  </chapter>

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