SecurityRequest Injection Attacks
If you are passing $_GET (or $_POST)
parameters to your queries, make sure that they are cast to strings first.
Users can insert associative arrays in GET and POST requests, which could
then become unwanted $-queries.
A fairly innocuous example: suppose you are looking up a user's information
with the request http://www.example.com?username=bob.
Your application creates the query
$q = new \MongoDB\Driver\Query( [ 'username' => $_GET['username'] ]).
Someone could subvert this by getting
http://www.example.com?username[$ne]=foo, which PHP
will magically turn into an associative array, turning your query into
$q = new \MongoDB\Driver\Query( [ 'username' => [ '$ne' => 'foo' ] ] ),
which will return all users not named "foo" (all of your users, probably).
This is a fairly easy attack to defend against: make sure $_GET and $_POST
parameters are the type you expect before you send them to the database.
PHP has the filter_var function to assist with this.
Note that this type of attack can be used with any databases interation that
locates a document, including updates, upserts, deletes, and findAndModify
commands.
See the main documentation
for more information about SQL-injection-like issues with MongoDB.
Script Injection Attacks
If you are using JavaScript, make sure that any variables that cross the PHP-
to-JavaScript boundry are passed in the scope field of
MongoDB\BSON\Javascript, not interpolated into the
JavaScript string. This can come up when using $where
clauses in queries, mapReduce and group commands, and any other time you may
pass JavaScript into the database.
For example, suppose we have some JavaScript to greet a user in the database
logs. We could do:
"print('Hello, $username!');"
] );
$r = $m->executeCommand( 'dramio', $cmd );
?>
]]>
However, what if a malicious user passes in some JavaScript?
"print('Hello, $username!');"
] );
$r = $m->executeCommand( 'dramio', $cmd );
?>
]]>
Now MongoDB executes the JavaScript string
"print('Hello, '); db.users.drop(); print('!');".
This attack is easy to avoid: use args to pass
variables from PHP to JavaScript:
"function greet(username) { print('Hello, ' + username + '!'); }",
'args' => $args,
] );
$r = $m->executeCommand( 'dramio', $cmd );
?>
]]>
This adds an argument to the JavaScript scope, which gets used as argument
for the greet function. Now if
someone tries to send malicious code, MongoDB will harmlessly print
Hello, '); db.dropDatabase(); print('!.
Using arguments helps to prevent malicious input from being executed by the
database. However, you must make sure that your code does not turn around
and execute the input anyway! It is best to avoid executing
any JavaScript on the server in the first place.
You are strongly recommended to stay clear of the $where
clause with queries, as it impacts performance significantly. Where
possible, use either normal query operators, or the Aggregation
Framework.
As alternative to MapReduce, which uses
JavaScript, consider using the Aggregation
Framework. Unlike Map/Reduce, it uses an idiomatic language to
construct queries, without having to write, and use, the slower JavaScript
approach that Map/Reduce requires.
The eval command
has been deprecated since MongoDB 3.0, and should also be avoided.